there exists 'some' jurisprudences constantes on a limited number of points [some of which, it is true, are important (such as recognition of the ius standi of shareholders or the binding force of provisional measures-two areas in which the Court has played a role)] and an unfortunate jurisprudential mess on many others-eg with regard to the definition of an 'investment', 3 the consequences of most favored nation (MFN) clauses 4 or umbrella the present time-an exception in customary international law allowing for protection by substitution, such as is relied on by Guinea'. 10 And regardless of the fact that various international agreements, such as agreements for the promotion and protection of foreign investments and the Washington Convention, have established special legal regimes governing investment protection, or that provisions in this regard are commonly included in contracts entered into directly between States and foreign investors, [this] is not sufficient to show that there has been a change in the customary rules of diplomatic protection; it could equally show the contrary.
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This is tenable in the abstract; it is nevertheless quite cavalier for the thousands of BITs and contracts and the hundreds of sentences that form the contemporary investment law but are, nevertheless, reduced to the rank of 'specific regimes'. In any event, it is evident that 'there is no obstacle in international law to the expression of the will of States through treaties being at the same time an expression of practice and of the opinio juris necessary for the birth of a customary rule if the conditions for it are met'; 12 and, one day, it will have to be admitted that the critical mass has been reached. In Mondev, the Tribunal expressed the view that 'such a body of concordant practice will necessarily have influenced the content of rules governing the treatment of foreign investment in current international law'. 13 Whatever the ICJ may think, it seems to me that the threshold has been reached, even though it is difficult for me to take this criticism any further: I developed this argument on behalf of Guinea 14 and . . . I have obviously failed to convince the Court, and cursing one's judges is unseemly (even if they are wrong!).
Nevertheless, if the ICJ is not more responsive to the deep changes in investment law-and, more broadly, in international law-it may find itself locked in an ivory tower, which could again empty its docket and take it back to its drowsiness of the 1970s. As the CMS Tribunal noted in its Decision on Jurisdiction of 17 July 2003, 'the fact is that lex specialis in this respect is so prevalent that it can now be considered the general rule, certainly in respect of foreign investments and increasingly in respect of other matters '. 15 In any event, as seen from The Hague, the relations between the two jurisprudences do not lend themselves to long developments although we may still draw two conclusions from the rare pronouncements of the Court on that matter: First, it seems that the Court does not accept the existence of an 'ICSID system' but only of a series of special rules applicable on a case-by-case. Secondly, these special rules are rooted in international law that the ICJ is to apply pursuant to its function. Now, what is the situation from the ICSID perspective? (The term 'ICSID' covers both the 'soft' institutional mechanism set up by the 1965 Washington 10 ibid 615, para 89. 11 ibid 615, para 90. 12 Sempra Energy (n 5) para 156. 13 As the Tribunal in AWG v Argentina put it:
Although this tribunal is not bound by such prior decisions, they do constitute 'a subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of [international] law'. Moreover, considerations of basic justice would lead tribunals to be guided by the basic judicial principle that 'like cases should be decided alike', unless a strong reason exists to distinguish the current case from previous ones. In addition, a recognized goal of international investment law is to establish a predictable, stable legal framework for investments, a factor that justifies tribunals in giving due regard to previous decisions on similar issues. Thus, absent compelling reasons to the contrary, a tribunal should always consider heavily solutions established in a series of consistent cases.
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As close as it may seem to that of the ICJ and the other bodies that I just mentioned, this practice of ICSID tribunals nevertheless presents some distinctive features that reflect the special characteristics of ICSID, which inevitably influences the use of precedents by arbitral tribunals and ad hoc committees. Resulting from a not always harmonious marriage between public international law and commercial arbitration, 24 25 and as I just mentioned, absent an agreement between the parties to the contrary, ICSID tribunals are required to apply 'such rules of international law as may be applicable'-a formula which is much more meaningful in French: 'les principes du droit international en la matière'.
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Secondly, as the World Court, but unlike the DSB or the regional courts of human rights, 'the Centre and ICSID tribunals appointed by the Centre, do not have general jurisdiction over States-they are tribunals of limited powers; and no presumption in favour of their jurisdiction can be made'; 27 therefore, their decisions are 'case-specific'.
Unlike a standing adjudicative body which addresses multiple disputes (for example, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal . . . ), an arbitral panel that is focused on a particular dispute is not confronted with the possibility that it will need to apply an earlier decision in a later proceeding. Likewise, an arbitral tribunal is not confronted with the task of reconciling its later decisions with its earlier ones.
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Thirdly, more than commercial arbitration mechanisms, ICSID is semiinstitutionalized: a developed Secretariat with solid traditions; rules of procedures reasonably well established; an almost systematic publication of awards; and an annulment procedure. But as debatable as the formula may be, each tribunal claims to be 'sovereign', 29 and the intervention of ad hoc committees [also constituted on a case-by-case basis (unfortunately in my opinion)] contributes only marginally to the standardization of the jurisprudence: 'The annulment mechanism is not designed to bring about consistency in the interpretation and application of international investment law.' tribunals resort to case law-an easy and reassuring argument of authority-thus avoiding the need to face the mysteries of the formation and evidence of customary international law.
ICSID tribunals do refer to precedents as elucidating tools-even though, with all due respect, I think that there is no rule of precedent either de jure or de facto.
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The tribunals discuss the jurisprudence-constante or not-and use it extensively in order to justify their decisions in a manner similar to that of other international courts or tribunals:
(a) they refer to precedents-sometimes abundantly; 35 (b) they apply the art of distinguishing, typical of courts of common law countries; 36 but (c) they allow themselves to overturn a jurisprudence-even constante; (d) they call, with an apparently sincere conviction, for the consistency and the continuity of case law and for 'the harmonious development of investment law'; 37 (e) they regularly put this 'harmonious development' constantly at risk-at least in some matters-by claiming their alleged 'sovereignty' 38 and the lack of hierarchy in the ICSID system; 39 and (f) they rely on future tribunals to ensure the stability called for while they themselves jeopardize it.
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This is very well illustrated and summarized in SGS v Philippines (an award for which I have a limited sympathy 41 ):
[A]lthough different tribunals constituted under the ICSID system should in general seek to act consistently with each other, in the end it must be for each tribunal to exercise its competence in accordance with the applicable law, which will by definition be different for each BIT and each Respondent State. Moreover there is no doctrine of precedent in international law, if by precedent is meant a rule of the binding effect of a single decision. There is no hierarchy of international tribunals, and even if there were, there is no good reason for allowing the first tribunal in time to resolve issues for all later tribunals. It must be initially for the control mechanisms provided for under the BIT and the ICSID Convention, and in the longer term for the development of a common legal opinion or jurisprudence constante, to resolve the difficult 34 See eg Reed (n 2). See also di Pietro (n 2); Schreuer and Weiniger (n 2); Thomas Wälde, 'The Specific Nature of Investment Arbitration' in Philippe Khan and Thomas Wälde (eds), Les aspects nouveaux du droit des investissements internationaux/New aspects of international investment law (Nijhoff 2007) 42-120; and Weeramantry (n 2).
35 Pey Casado (n 3) para 119. See also Ambiente Ufficio (n 3 In general, ICSID tribunals give priority to the case law of their peers or other investment tribunals. This is quite natural-if only because, statistically, they are obviously the ones to have dealt most with identical issues. However, ICSID tribunals are probably less hesitant than the World Court to invoke what may be called 'exogenous' or 'external' case law-that is to say, decisions of courts or tribunals outside the ICSID system or international investment law. ICSID Tribunals are even more justified to resort to international case law given that the ICSID system is only 'semi-exogenous' since it is rooted in international law and is internationally oriented. This is also true for the case law of courts and tribunals acting in other international 'sub-systems' such as that of the WTO, 43 those stemming from regional conventions on human rights, 44 that of the European Union, 45 and that of international criminal courts and tribunals. 46 It is also true of the case law of courts and tribunals acting under general international law, 47 of which the World Court has defined itself as being the 'organ'. 48 And we finally reach the heart of the matter! Not only do ICSID tribunals (and other investment tribunals) refer to the jurisprudence of the World Court, but they show a particular deference to it:
The Tribunal [in Azurix] is required to consider the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the BIT under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. The findings of other tribunals, and in particular of the ICJ, should be helpful to the Tribunal in its interpretative task. In this regard, the Tribunal does not find it necessary to engage in an hierarchical analysis of precedent. On one hand, the Tribunal accords deference to relevant statements by the ICJ of general principles as to the construction of the terms of a treaty as those principles may apply to the construction of the BIT. On the other hand, as there is no precedential order in regard to previous decisions on the construction of bilateral investment treaties, the relevant enquiry remains for the Tribunal to interpret and apply the terms of the BIT itself. Prior decisions may inform that enquiry, but it is for this Tribunal to make its own interpretation of Article 8(2), informed by the rigor and persuasiveness of relevant analysis and statements by decisions of earlier tribunals.
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This is a rather convincing view: the ICJ case law may guide ICSID tribunals when they apply general principles of treaty interpretation, as in the 5 March 2013 decision in Tulip Real Estate. However, when one turns to the legal framework for foreign investment, only investment jurisprudence will be usedand, regardless of any theoretical position, there is a good reason for that: the Court has rarely been called upon to deal with investment issues, even less to apply BITs-and when, exceptionally, it has dealt with such issues, one may find its positions (hesitant and probably little adapted to contemporary needs in this area) unattractive.
With regard to the general principles of the law of treaties and of treaty interpretation in particular, 52 (and more generally, with respect to the sources of international law, notably as regards the existence of a rule of customary international law), 53 the content and limits of competences of the State, 54 the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals, 55 procedural issues before these jurisdictions such as the junction of the preliminary objections to the merits, 56 the legal consequences of incidental proceedings like interim measures, 57 the burden of proof, 58 in abstentia proceedings, 59 or the interpretation 60 or annulment 61 of awards, the case law of the ICJ is accepted as having vested a rather high degree of authority in ICSID awards. The same is true for the general principles of law of State responsibility but with a caveat.
All categories together, when a tribunal examines the existence of a state of necessity, the Factory at Chorzów 62 case is certainly the most cited case in this field, closely followed by Elsi 63 and Barcelona Traction 64 (if one includes issues of ius standi of the victim and the protection of shareholders), not to mention Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros. However, it is worth noting that, with respect to the law of State responsibility, the ICSID tribunals rely much more on the 2001 International Law Commission (ILC) Articles than on the case law of the Court, which is less systematic by necessity.
Before trying to draw some more general conclusions from this, it is worth considering how ICSID tribunals resort to the case law of the ICJ, the place they give to it and the method, or methods, they use to establish or strengthen their reasoning.
The first observation, which leads to a more detailed examination in this regard, is the extreme diversity in the intensity with which ICSID tribunals refer to the Court's case law and in the methods applied by these tribunals-they range from polite indifference to compelling authority.
First, an example of polite indifference-or rather what can be called 'respectful irrelevance': awards pay lip service to the case law of the World Court but do not take it into consideration the pretext of its alleged irrelevance. This is striking with regard to the protection of shareholders. Professor Zachary Douglas, who deplores this indifference, notes humorously:
Consider the jurisprudence constante in relation to the issue of shareholder claims. There are now between 15 and 20 decisions all saying the same thing. They say that there is no limit to the types of claims shareholders can bring in relation to a loss suffered by the company. I would submit that this consensus has been achieved without any real argument about principle.
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And he then explains that:
You find a great number of awards saying in one sentence that they can safely ignore Barcelona Traction because it has nothing to do with investment treaty arbitration. The International Court in Barcelona Traction got a number of things wrong, and to the extent that it propounded rules of diplomatic protection it is irrelevant. But one point the International Court and several individual judges addressed is how to approach the concept of a shareholding on the international plane. That is relevant to investment treaty arbitration, for tribunals are required to confront precisely the same question. 66 However, Professor Douglas regrets that ICSID tribunals superbly ignore these relevant questions and stick to their jurisprudence constante.
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The Award of 17 July 2003 in the CMS case is a first example of this dismissive attitude. The Tribunal states as a principle that: 'Barcelona Traction is therefore not directly relevant to the present dispute, although it marks the beginning of a fundamental change of the applicable concepts under international law and State practice.' 68 Then, while making a noticeable mistake with respect to the ILC's majority position, as it then was, on the nature of the diplomatic protection, 69 the CMS Tribunal takes the radical position on the matter, according to which, under the lex specialis 'investissmentorum', any shareholder deserves protection, regardless of the issues raised by the Court and by the Judges in their respective individual opinions in Barcelona Traction.
In many subsequent awards, without any further reflection, ICSID tribunals, neutralizing Elsi and Barcelona Traction-defined as 'the seminal case, in this regard' by the majority in Tokios Tokelès 71 -almost ritually explain that:
whatever may have been the merits of Barcelona Traction, that case was concerned solely with the diplomatic protection of nationals by their State, while the case here disputed concerns the contemporary concept of direct access for investors to dispute resolution by means of arbitration between investors and the State.
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The same iterative approach can be found in LG&E (jurisdiction), 73 Gami (merits), 74 Sempra (jurisdiction), 75 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas (jurisdiction), 76 BP America (jurisdiction) 77 -each new decision adding a reference to the previous one. The Decisions on Annulment in CMS 78 and Azurix 79 proceed the same way, the reasoning being enriched only by a reference to the Diallo case. 80 Thus, with regard to the protection of shareholders, ICSID tribunals unanimously greet the jurisprudence of the ICJ, which reflects customary rules of general international law, but they then hide behind the lex specialis dogma to faithfully follow the jurisprudence, constante on this point, of investment tribunals.
Still in the field of state responsibility, one would expect frequent references to the Court's case law with regard to attribution issues, for which, as some tribunals noted, neither the Washington Convention nor generally BITs are of any help. 81 This is only partially-or indirectly-true: on these particular issues, ICSID tribunals use much more readily and systematically the 2001 ILC Articles than the jurisprudence of the Court. The 2001 ILC Articles, together with their commentaries, 82 often constitute sufficient evidence of the applicable law on that matter, the case law (including but not exclusively) of the ICJ appearing only as a secondary argument to support the reasoning. 83 Here, it is not polite indifference but rather 'eclipsed jurisprudence'-eclipsed by a soft law instrument considered to be law. ICSID tribunals have followed the same approach with respect to the state of necessity-an exceptional and useless circumstance precluding wrongfulness, which has been very much invoked in international investment law in the context of the Argentina crisis. Although one ICJ Judgment, that in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case in 1997, is frequently invoked, 84 Article 25 of the 2001 ILC Articles has eclipsed the Court's case law in many awards. In this regard, the formula used in paragraph 330 of the 2005 Award in the CMS case is symptomatic:
There is yet another important element which the Tribunal must take into account. The International Court of Justice has in the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros case convincingly referred to the International Law Commission's view that all the conditions governing necessity must be 'cumulatively' satisfied. 85 It is worth noting that, in the 2007 Decision on Annulment, the ad hoc Committee has only examined the 2001 ILC Articles and, of course, the relevant provisions of the BIT.
When looking beyond the law of international responsibility, curiously, the record is rather less meagre. This is so when one looks at the meaning and scope of the MFN clause-or, more accurately, clauses, since it is impossible to reduce those very diverse provisions to one. And the recourse of ICSID tribunals to the jurisprudence of the Hague Court in this respect attests to the fact that they too have become masters in the art of distinguishing. In almost every case in which an MFN clause has been invoked, the tribunals have discussed three judgments of the ICJ rendered respectively in the Anglo-Iranian case 86 -which was described by the Tribunal in Wintershall as of 'seminal theoretical significance'; 87 in the Case concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco;
88 and in Ambatielos, 89 and, with regard to the latter, together with the 1956 Arbitral Award which settled the case. 90 Here, the leading (and controversial) case is Maffezini, which served as a reference for almost all subsequent awards dealing with the issue which took position either in favour or against it. In its Award of 25 January 2000, the Maffezini Tribunal, for the first time to my knowledge, referred to the case law I have just mentioned. The Tribunal presents the Judgments of the Court as the context-the 'background'-in the framework of which 'the operation of the most favoured nation clause in bilateral investment treaties must . . . be considered'. 91 It then cited the ICSID case law and the Award in AAPL in particular.
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The 2004 Award in Siemens v Argentina proceeds (more clearly) in the same manner, by relying on the same ICJ precedents to reach the same conclusion, reinforced by a mention of Maffezini.
93 On the contrary, the Salini v Jordan Tribunal also mentions the same three judgments of the Court (and the Ambatielos Award), but, this time, to deny their relevance: 'The first two judgments mentioned [Anglo-Iranian Oil Co and Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco] do not address the issue thus posed. In the third case [Ambatielos] , . . . the Court did not decide on the merits' of the line of argument developed by Greece and based on the MFN clause. But at the same time, the Tribunal mentioned the positions of 'judges dissenting from the solution adopted [who] took positions on the submissions of Greece based on the most-favorednation clause as incorporated in the 1886 Treaty. Their view was that the clause ''cannot be extended to matters other than those in respect of which it has been stipulated'' .' They added that 'having regard to its terms', this clause 'promises most-favoured-nation treatment only in matters of commerce and navigation' and that, consequently, it cannot be applied to 'the administration of justice' 94 -an interesting example of recourse to dissident opinions to interpret the Court's jurisprudence. And the Tribunal in Salini v Jordan concluded: 'The Tribunal observes that the circumstances of this case are different.' 95 In Plama, the Tribunal followed the same approach:
In Maffezini the tribunal relied on Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of America in Morocco, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, and Ambatielos Claim. However, the foregoing review of those decisions shows that they do not provide a conclusive answer to the question. 96 More recently, in an Award dated 10 February 2012, the Tribunal in ICS Inspection apparently adopted (I do not find the Award crystal clear) the same position but by paying lip service to the importance of the ICJ case law. According to the Tribunal:
These cases [Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and Ambatielos] must therefore be taken into account not only as legal authorities on the proper interpretation of MFN clauses, but also as precedent that informed subsequent treaty drafting.
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To conclude on MFN clauses: lip service, discussion, distinction and-even though this is not relevant to tonight's topic-inconsistency of investment arbitration case law, or to quote the harsh but justified statement of the Wintershall Tribunal 'a welter of inconsistent and confusing dicta'; 98 a 'mess' essentially resulting from an inconsistent analysis of the ICJ case law by investment tribunals.
What is more intriguing (but less regrettable) is the use made by ICSID tribunals of a separate opinion appended to an ICJ judgment regarding the conditions to which the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals is subjected. This saga shows 'cross-fertilization' which may exist between the two systems and is far from being uninteresting. It can be broken down into five acts. 99 Act 1: in a separate opinion appended to the ICJ Judgment of 1996 rendered in the Oil Platforms case, at the stage of preliminary exceptions, Judge Higgins explicitly and clearly put forward a condition to the jurisdiction of the Court dealt with rather allusively in the Judgment itself. According to Dame Rosalyn: 100 The only way in which, in the present case, it can be determined whether the claims of Iran are sufficiently plausibly based upon the 1955 Treaty is to accept pro tem the facts as alleged by Iran to be true and in that light to interpret Articles I, IV and X for jurisdictional purposes-that is to say, to see if on the basis of Iran's claims of fact there could occur a violation of one or more of them. 117 ('can be considered resolved today, in the light of the case law and . . . of a recent judgement of the International Court of Justice'). It is true that, without being able to draw on the sleight of hand of the ICJ-which equates 'indicate' with 'decide'-the Maffezini Tribunal had done worse two years earlier by identifying 'recommend' with 'order'-with, it is true, the excuse of the Spanish text of Article 47 of the ICSID Convention, in which 'recommendation' is oddly translated by 'dictación'.
118 Again, we can note a 'preference for the Court' because it seems that even though they do not completely ignore this precedent, subsequent ICSID tribunals have relied more systematically on LaGrand than on Maffezini in this regard.
Of course, in accordance with the unfortunate habit of jurisprudential accumulation, they mention the LaGrand case and the Award in Pey Casado and add a reference to each new precedent following the same approach, the solution being now presented as part of positive law, but without even bothering to refer to Article 47 of the Convention-which might be a worthwhile precaution since the judge-made rule is so clearly incompatible with the text of this provision. 119 The only exception appears to be the (perhaps) courageous decision on provisional measures rendered in the Caratube International Oil Company v Kazakhstan case, but it is isolated and not very clear to a Cartesian mind. 120 In any event, I would not take the risk of challenging that, even though I do not approve of it, the solution of the 2001 Judgment in the LaGrand case is fully integrated into ICSID positive law. And this shows that judicial or arbitral bodies hardly resist the temptation when they see a possibility to extend their power-if not their legitimacy; and ICSID tribunals have been only too happy to shelter their appetite for competence under the fig leaf offered by the World Court's position.
It is now time to conclude. The empirical approach I have chosen does not lead to obvious conclusions-other than disappointing platitudes that I will deliver, shamelessly, in five propositions.
First, ICSID tribunals refer to the ICJ case law in a pragmatic manner, without resorting to predetermined methods; it is never a mere 'application' of the Court's jurisprudence, but it constitutes a subsidiary means for determination of rules of law, to use the formula in Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the ICJ. Secondly, they do systematically refer to the Court's jurisprudence, but they are more likely to do so when resolving procedural issues (lato sensu) or questions of general international law rather than when dealing with investment protection standards.
Thirdly, even though it had little opportunity to venture into the field of investment law, the Court still has a significant influence on investment tribunals (as much as on other international courts and tribunals), an influence which likely goes beyond their mere search for an enhanced legitimacy. In this respect, it would certainly be interesting to study more carefully the hypotheses of 'mimétisme' (mimetism), 121 'judicial borrowing', 122 or 'cross-fertilisation' 123 put forward by certain authors.
Fourthly, the relative porosity of ICSID arbitration with the World Court's case law confirms, if confirmation were needed, that international investment law has its roots in general international law, despite its undeniable specificity.
Fifthly, as was noted by the ICSID Tribunal in AAPL as early as June 1990:
it should be noted that the Bilateral Investment Treaty [and this is more generally true for the whole ICSID system] is not a self-contained closed legal system limited to provide for substantive material rules of direct applicability, but it has to be envisaged within a wider juridical context in which rules from other sources are integrated through implied incorporation methods, or by direct reference to certain supplementary rules, whether of international law character or of domestic law nature. 124 
